Introduction
In considering the question of climate-correlated Arctic 1 conflict, this article looks beyond the casus belli usually discussed and instead approaches the problem from a holistic perspective. Although only some 6% of the Earth's surface, the Arctic is linked to the rest of the planet geopolitically, as well as by economics and climate; and as that climate changes, so there are potential military ramifications. The simple answer to the question: "Will conflict become more likely in the Arctic as the climate changes?" is yes, but not necessarily for the reasons generally discussed. This article will explore the complexity of the question via a set of misconceptions, perhaps better described as myths, 2 regarding the Arctic. These misconceptions, taken in sum, form a tapestry of misunderstanding that brings little benefit to the policymaker or government servant attempting to create plans in an uncertain world. At best, they have the potential to disrupt the hard-won political progress that is emerging in the Arctic. At worst, they might bring about a self-fulfilling prophesy in which incremental escalation engenders a needless confrontation. This article forms no part of the climate change debate and focuses exclusively on security matters on the assumption that the Arctic climate will change over time.
Myth 1: the risk of Arctic conflict is a new phenomenon ... Over the last few months, the international community has taken notice of the deployment and expansion of militaries to a new frontier, the Arctic Circle. Despite naysayers, the militaries of states such as the United States, Russia, Canada and the Scandinavian powers have demonstrated their acknowledgment of global warming by directing their forces in various exercises aimed at understanding and mastering this new battlefield...
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The Navy will soon have a new battlefield on its hands. Climate changes near the North Pole have been dramatic. The amount of summertime ice has decreased by half over the past 50 years... 4 An examination of recent literature relating to the effects of Arctic climate change and the potential it may have to engender conflict might leave the lay reader with the impression that a previously unencountered geographical dimension to warfare had emerged. Some government sources have been quick to emphasise the development of peaceful relations in the Arctic, 5 yet at the same time,
there is an extensive programme of infrastructure refurbishment, such as the repair and reconstruction of bases in the Russian North, and investment in intelligence capabilities. Citing numerous sources, Petterson 6 reports that the Canadian government has refurbished an intelligence collection station on Ellesmere Island, some 800 km from the North Pole. The installation, Canadian Forces Station (CFS) Alert, is a former Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line site. 7 In 2016, the Norwegian Government will replace the "Marjata", a Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS) vessel that has patrolled the Barents Sea since 1995, with a new and more capable vessel of the same name. 8 Petterson notes the comments of the Head of the NIS:
Its task will be to systematically map all military and some civilian activity in areas close to Norway. When we have a complete picture, we can determine what the normal activity looks like. Then it will be easier to discover deviations from the norm. That is what we should discover. That is why we're there,...
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Whether this process of defence capability enhancement is to be viewed as restoration or escalation will be considered later; first, the perception that climate change is in some sense creating a hitherto uncontested environment will be addressed.
Violent conflict in the Arctic is nothing new; in fact, the polar North has long been a battleground. A site at Saunaktuk in the Canadian Arctic bears archaeological witness to the massacre of at least 35 people in the 14th century. 10 Burch 11 notes that indigenous people conducted ambushes, raids, and battles in Western Alaska during the early contact period (c1775-1850). The Chukchi successfully resisted Russian imperial absorption in the 18th century. 12 The American civil war spilled into the Bering Sea in the 19th century when the Confederate commerce raider CSS Shenandoah attacked Union vessels there. 13 In the 20th century, Finland and Russia fought a major land conflict in the winter war of 1939-1940, 14 while the allied convoys to resupply Russia with military materiel in the Second World War endured severe losses. 15 The Arctic is a battlespace 16 with particularly brutal environmental hazards. Considering the 1943 allied operation Sandcrab to retake Attu in the Aleutian islands, 17 out of an allied force that totalled more than 15,000 men, 549 were killed, another 1,148 wounded, and some 2,132 taken out of action by disease and nonbattle injuries. 18 One thousand two hundred of the nonbattle casualties were severe cold injuries, and a further 318 of the disease cases were exposure victims. 19 Soldiers suffered from "trench foot" as a result of inadequate equipment, 20 and such environmental risks persist into the modern era; almost 20% of British casualties in the Falklands 21 war were cold injuries. 22 During the Cold War, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Ballistic Missile Early Warning System radars searched for incoming nuclear attacks across the Arctic, and the DEW system (the DEW Line, replaced by the North Warning System in the 1980s) covered airborne threats approaching Canada and the United States from the direction of the Arctic Ocean. 23 The Soviet government established a submarine bastion in the Barents and Kara Seas -an area in which their own ballistic missile submarines could be protected with military assets against any incursion by NATO forces. 24 The Arctic is not merely a battlefield of ancient standing; it actually contains recognised war graves. The Commonwealth War Graves Commission maintains 115 graves in Arctic Russia alone 25 ; some 227 others may be found in Arctic Norway. These graves stand as testimony to the long history of Arctic conflict -a history that may be traced from the 14th century to the 20th century and the Cold War. Yet, if Arctic nations are indeed bracing themselves against the threat of fresh armed struggle, what casus belli are envisioned as the sources of hostility?
Myth 2: climate change makes Arctic resources easier to win
The rush for the Arctic has become more frenzied because of the melting of parts of the polar ice cap, which will allow easier exploration, and by the urgent need for new sources of oil and gas.
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Over the past decade geological surveys have shown that the Arctic has huge underground reservoirs of oil and natural gas. Now that the ice is melting, and the technology and expertise to undertake deep-water drilling has been developed, these resources are for the first time open to exploitation, and they promise to bestow huge benefits on whichever country can claim them as their own.
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Roger Howard very properly goes on to follow the second quotation above with cautionary comments regarding the recoverability of Arctic hydrocarbon deposits, and indeed, the reliability of the estimates of their magnitude. Considering the view that climate change makes the resources easier to win, and the associated inferences regarding "resource wars", the problem with its validity is in two parts; first, it is technically misleading -some Arctic resources may become more readily available, while others will face significant challenges that may affect their commercial viability. Second, the assumption that greater resource availability provides a casus belli and necessarily increases the potential for violent conflict is unsupported by the evidence, as will be discussed later. Certainly, natural resources may provide grounds for dispute that collapse into open warfare, 28 but the process that leads to conflict is complex, and not all disputed resources give rise to war. The more predictable causal agency in Arctic conflict will be considered later, first however, the issue of additional availability of resources will be addressed in detail.
The value of a resource depends on its scarcity, and although a very general assessment of Arctic hydrocarbon resources estimated undiscovered reserves at 90 bn barrels of oil and 1,669 tn cu ft of gas, 29 the extent to which specific deposits may be exploited depends on market price. Setting aside the reliability of such estimates, 30 unless the price for oil renders the potentially enormous cost of Arctic exploration and production competitive on the world market, it will not be commercially viable. Moreover, for producible reserves in disputed areas of the Arctic, neighbour nations are reluctant to jeopardise valuable political relationships over such resources. 31 An example of what can go wrong when such relationships are overlooked occurred in 2003, when the US government auctioned oil and gas leases in a disputed region of the Beaufort Sea Ottawa filed a diplomatic protest and faced with the prospect of a long-term legal wrangle, international energy companies withdrew interest.
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There is an assumption that oil and gas development will be aided by warming. New offshore prospects may be easier to access by ship traffic, but in many respects, shore fast ice is a preferable engineering problem, because it is possible to build structures, including ice roads, on such ice.
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Thus, if the prospect is to be developed from an offshore island using techniques such as directional drilling, the island and its associated infrastructure may be constructed using ice roads as a means of access. 34 For oil development operations on permafrost, legal permits may specify that drilling is undertaken only during frozen conditions when spills are more easily collected and relief rigs may be deployed on ice roads after a loss of well control incident. 35 However, as the climate changes, the period of surface freezing is contracting. Spills in broken sea ice are extremely challenging to deal with. 36 They defy boom deployment, combustion is very difficult to sustain, 37 and biodegradation may take much longer than at other latitudes.
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Arctic tourism is an economic activity that certainly appears to be flourishing as ice ablation proceeds. The Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment estimated the total number of cruise ship tourists travelling to the Arctic in 2004 at over 1.2 million; by 2007, the number had more than doubled. 39 This represents a valuable commercial opportunity and also provides a medium for raising awareness of the Arctic, including its natural environment. Simultaneously, the increment in ship traffic brings environmental and other risks that require proper management.
A change in Arctic marine ecosystems in response to climate change is already being reported.
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Finfish tend to follow oceanic temperature contours; a northward spread and increased spawning stock biomass and recruitment is being observed in cod. 41 Not all of these changes will be beneficial. Some Arctic species are suffering reduction or displacement. 42 In terms of conflict between states parties over biological resources, there is at present only one area of significant potential dispute and that is the waters around Svalbard.
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The Northern Sea Route (NSR) has been touted as a potential boon to shipping. 44 It is worth noting that some interport distances may be significantly reduced -24% or more 45 -although average speeds may be also reduced in some cases by up to 2.6 knots. 46 However, the availability of the route depends on the condition of the ice and that is difficult to predict; hence, container traffic may be disadvantaged by comparison with bulk cargo. 47 Under United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the Russian government is entitled to levy fair charges for services to vessels using the NSR such as icebreaking and pilotage in their territorial seas (UNCLOS Art 26). Russia may also enforce nondiscriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction, and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) (UNCLOS Art 234).
A warming environment in the Arctic does not equate in simple terms to a robust business case for hydrocarbon extraction. A number of complex factors must be taken into account, not the least of which is the means of addressing oil spills in broken sea ice. Oil is not the only resource whose threat is defined in military circles as capability coupled with intent. By contrast, a risk is classically defined as the combination of likelihood and impact of a hazard -a concept that can defined numerically, as the mathematical product of a probability and the value of a loss. 52 In the context of Arctic environmental change, the principal foci of concern in the literature have been economics (resources) or sovereignty (territorial, including maritime territorial delineation) as casus belli.
The elementary argument appears to follow the structure:
1. In the past, increased resource availability (A add ) has led to conflict (B): A add → B.
2. Climate change (C) will increase resource availability in the Arctic: C → A add .
3. Therefore, climate change will lead to conflict: C → B.
Both premises #1 and #2 of the argument are imprecise and questionable, and the simple implied conclusion is consequently unreliable. Koubi et al. point out that:
Only few large-N studies examine the role resource scarcity or abundance may play in interstate conflicts and most of the existing work of this nature concentrates on water resources. Perhaps surprisingly, only very few studies on interstate conflict concentrate on the role of other types of natural resources such as oil... although there is a rich qualitative literature on this subject...
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Despite the lack of rigorous support for the "Arctic casus belli" line of reasoning, a numerically based, noncausally focussed approach to conflict prediction has now emerged in a recent determination by Hsiang et and conflict, much work remains to be done to determine the causal process(es) involved. Identifying causal agency is important if political policy for the Arctic is to be properly informed. However, there is less doubt regarding the contribution to climate change, and therefore conflict, made by the Arctic. This contribution is complex and may involve many elements, including the change in albedo as the polar pack melts. 60 One key aspect of the process is methane genesis in the Arctic. 61 A more potent greenhouse gas than carbon dioxide, methane is already bubbling from melting permafrost according to reports by Arctic land and sea expeditions. 62 Methane also exists in abundance in the form of methane clathrates within the seabed, 63 although the likelihood of that source activating in the short term is considered low. 64 Nonetheless, as the Arctic releases quantities of methane into the atmosphere, it contributes to climate change and thereby to the likelihood of violence as correlated by Hsiang et al. 65 The key issue that tends to be missed in the literature is that the potential for Arctic conflict is less reliably predicted by reference to casus belli north of the Arctic Circle than to a process under which conflict spreads to the region. The involvement of the Arctic in conflict arising elsewhere would be for two reasons. First, the Arctic is where key military resources are based, in particular, the Northern Fleet and a substantial part of Russia's strategic nuclear assets. 66 Second, the North
Cape is the left flank of NATO's European theatre. In the event of a conflict with Russia, NATO would have to consider engaging in that theatre or risk being outflanked -perhaps suffering interdiction of reinforcements crossing the Atlantic. 67 We may conclude that there is indeed a proven link between climate change and an increased conflict risk, but it is more complex than the emergence of economic opportunities. Instead, the change in albedo and input of methane in the Arctic may alter the climate and bring about conflict that spreads to, rather than from the region. Some opine that the move towards conflict is already underway.
Myth 4: Russia is attempting to take over the Arctic
The new Cold War? Russia sends troops and missiles to the Arctic as Putin stakes a claim for the region's oil and gas reserves. 68 This is a curious perception that appears to have momentum in the literature. 69 What is not always realised is that the Arctic is a political theatre, attracting simultaneous activity at many levels.
Although military exercises, and reconnaissance flights by military aircraft continue unabated, 70 and some of this activity may have strong domestic appeal, simultaneously, there is a strong atmosphere of localism in Arctic politics.
Polar activity has not been confined to Russia. One of the most influential pieces of Arctic research in recent years was the US Geological Survey assessment of hydrocarbon deposits in the region. 71 Other scientific activity that attracted particular attention was the Arctic voyages of the Chinese icebreaking research vessel Xuelong. 72 Arctic investments by other nations also include military improvements. Canada is creating a facility for naval vessels at Nanisivuk and a training establishment at Resolute Bay (both located in Nunavut). 73 The Canadian government has also ordered a new class of Arctic offshore patrol vessels. 74 Norway has relocated helicopters to its northern base at Bardufoss.
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Russia is making a significant investment of its own in Arctic military infrastructure and reorganisation. Projects include the establishment of ten new "emergency-rescue centres" at Murmansk, Archangelsk, Naryan-Mar, Vorkuta, Nadym, Dudinka, Tiksi, Pevek, Provideniya, and Andyr. 76 It has been inferred that some of these bases will also provide facilities for Northern Fleet and Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (in Russian: Federal'naya sluzhba bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii, FSB) Border Service vessels. 77 Further evidence of Russia's commitment to the Arctic may be found in the recently commissioned nuclear icebreaker 50 Let Pobedy, which required the allocation of 2.5 bn from the federal budget for outfitting. 78 However, this programme of refurbishment follows many years of underinvestment. Arguably, considering the size of Russia, her position as a global actor, and the exposure of the economic assets in her polar waters, the current condition of her security forces-in particular the surface fleet-is unfit for purpose.
On 4 August 2015, Russia resubmitted her claim to oceanic boundaries in the Arctic to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf -as she is entitled to do under the UNCLOS. In fact, in terms of treaty law, Russia has been very active recently. In addition to the Ilulissat declaration of 2008 in collaboration with Canada, Denmark, Greenland, Russia, and the United States -collectively referred to as the Arctic 5 -she has signed and ratified a treaty on maritime delimitation and cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean. 79 That agreement entered into force on 7 July 2011, 80 No one is expecting a speedy resolution to the continental shelf-related claims but contrast Russia's recent behaviour to that of other Arctic 5 states -all of whom are NATO allies. Hans Island in the Nares Strait remains the only disputed landmass in the Arctic. 83 The island, a mere half square mile in extent, lies between the defined end points of two lines that delineate the respective law of the sea claims of Canada and Denmark. 84 It is a shortfall in cartographic diplomacy, yet attempts to solve the dispute have so far brought no progress. 85 Similarly, the dispute between Canada and the United States concerning the maritime boundary in the Beaufort Sea is unresolved, as is the legal status of the Northwest Passage.
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Although sovereignty remains an issue in the Arctic, the Norwegian/Russian settlement regarding the Barents represents significant progress. Unofficial agreements and diplomatic communications appear to be solving other disputes. 87 Such was the case in 2005 when the Russian trawler
Elektron made a dash for home waters during an inspection by two Norwegian fisheries inspectors. 88 The Norwegian officials were still on board at the time. 89 Although potentially serious, this incident was solved by diplomatic means, and the Russian Navy refused to become involved. 90 The Arctic 5 have made it clear in the Ilulissat declaration of 2008 that they want no Arctic treaty of the type created for Antarctica. Instead, they wish to solve issues themselves using the law of the sea provisions. Indeed, there seems to be a preference for excluding NATO from disputes, despite the fact that four members of the Arctic 5 are also from NATO nations. Any argument that Russia is attempting to effect Arctic territorial acquisition in an aggressive manner must therefore first dismiss two critical pieces of evidence: Russia's recent record of obedience to the tenets of treaty law, and its lack of the military wherewithal to impose a territorial gain by force. Other displays, such as planting seafloor flags or military exercises, should first be evaluated in the context of their domestic appeal.
Any conclusive evidence that Russia intends to gain sovereignty over areas in the Arctic by means other than those accepted within the tenets of international diplomacy has yet to emerge. However, nation states are not the only parties capable of acts of violence in the Arctic.
Myth 5: there is no risk of piracy in the Arctic …no piracy or terrorism issues from Arctic waters around Iceland and East Greenland have ever been reported. 91 One of the advantages touted for the NSR is a lack of piracy. 92 In fact, an examination of reports by shipping insurance companies reveals that at the global level, the industry is not particularly exercised by such losses. 93 Moreover, piracy has declined significantly of late, from 445 attacks 94 in 2010 to 245 in 2014. 95 Yet, the Arctic does suffer a form of piracy, one that is likely to see an increase as the climate changes, and indeed, one that may in due course lead to violence.
Piracy may be defined in various ways, 96 and one of them is illegal, unregulated, and unreported (IUU) fishing. IUU or pirate fishing represents a significant environmental threat. 97 Without proper records, there can be no reliable scientifically informed management of the catch. It is also economically injurious. 98 The ransom money taken by Somali pirates between 2005 and 2012 has been estimated by the UN and the World Bank at between $US 399-413m. 99 Contrast this with the estimated value of over 100,000 tons of cod caught illegally in the Barents for 2005 alone -$350m. 100 The annual legal catch of this species in the region is some 450,000 tons. 101 As the 21st century progresses and protein sources become scarcer, pirate fishing will become more lucrative.
It is already the case that the value of the catch in a pirate vessel's hold can exceed the value of the vessel itself. 102 There is a potential for conflict at the subnational scale over the illegal harvesting of biomarine resources. To give just one example, it is reported that in the so-called Turbot War, Canadian warships fired warning shots to Spanish trawlers just outside of Canadian waters. 103 Violence may come about in the Arctic at the subnation state level as a result of marine resource conflict. There are precedents in fishing grounds in other parts of the world, and the value of the commodities involved creates a powerful incentive for unlawful behaviour. As with any form of organised criminal activity, one of the principal measures to manage the risk will be the provision of intelligence.
Discussion -what are the implications for intelligence policy?
The geopolitical and economic effects of climate change on the Arctic region are already manifesting themselves. To date, there has been much discussion of the potential for those effects to give rise to conflict. However, much of the discussion has focussed on less probable causal factors and largely ignored those that more likely, and indeed, might be mitigated with concerted political and military action.
The problem of climate-induced Arctic conflict may be considered as three threats, which will be addressed in turn:
Interstate conflict. Much has been written regarding extant territorial disputes between the Arctic five countries, 104 yet there are strong indications that such disputes will be solved through political and diplomatic discourse. Åtland notes the potentially serious nature of the above-mentioned Elektron episode:
The trawler refused to follow instructions given by the Norwegians, and suddenly took off from its pursuers, with two Coast Guard inspectors still on board. This lead (sic) to a threeday chase through the Barents Sea… Contrary to what many expected at the outset of the pursuit, the Elektron incident did not escalate to become a militarized interstate dispute between Norway and Russia. Instead, it was handled in a non-confrontational manner by diplomats, and later, the judicial system. 105 The most significant issue is the potential for climate change to increase the risk of conflict between NATO members and Russia through the now proven link between environmental change and violence, 106 and for that dispute to spread to the Arctic nations. 107 The northern seas are the bastion in which the Northern Fleet nuclear assets are protected, and the North Cape is a point of emergence if Russia wishes to interdict NATO's Atlantic resupply or flank the NATO European battlespace. A European conflict, however initiated, will inevitably have the potential to spread to that part of the Arctic. The indications are that Arctic nations are reinforcing their intelligence operations in line with the need to collect and analyse the information necessary to anticipate and thwart military conflict. 108 However, there are further dimensions to enhanced intelligence activity in the Arctic:
Nonstate conflict. Included within this threat are piracy in the form of illegal and unregulated fishing, and insurgency. The collaborative policing of Arctic biomarine resources is not merely beneficial for the protection of the ecosystem, it also represents an opportunity to build and reinforce much needed links between Arctic, and indeed other nations.
Another source of potential subnational scale conflict from which the Arctic is not immune is insurgency. Due to the remoteness of the Arctic and difficulty in policing the areas involved, high visibility attacks against relatively modestly defended targets such as oil installations and cruise ships could confer publicity of the sort attractive to insurgents. Nacos cites one source that exemplifies the view of insurgents in their desire to obtain press coverage and public attention: "we would throw roses if it would work." 109 A burning Arctic oil rig or cruise liner would capture such attention. Certainly, the logistical difficulties involved in an Arctic attack would diminish its likelihood for many insurgent groups but not eliminate it. Indeed, if the intention was merely to board and disable a vessel, or inflict great economic damage without sinking it, the problem is greatly simplified. In this context, Lehr notes:
…it can be expected that such acts of ecoterrorism will increase in frequency over the next couple of years, affecting other types of ships more and more. Vessels transporting hazardous cargoes such as nuclear waste or chemicals readily come to mind, and so do offshore installations such as oil rigs or mobile drilling platforms, especially so if they are intended for explorative drilling in the previously "pristine" Arctic or Antarctic waters. 110 For attacks against terrestrial installations, the logistical challenge for the perpetrator may be simpler still.
The insurgency threat is primarily a question of protecting remote and valuable economic assets: oil installations, pipelines, and cruise ships. Extending the collaboration between the Arctic nations offers an opportunity to mitigate the risk and strengthen trust.
The Arctic 5 have common enemies in the nonstate conflict sphere. Sharing information and resources would confer soft power advantages, and in the context of intelligence for nonstate conflict, it is worth remembering that in the Arctic, all collection assets may be needed in order to dominate the battlespace. For example, in the terrestrial environment, a surveillance role is played by ranger organisations such as the Canadian Rangers 111 and the Danish Navy's Sirius sledge patrol in the northeast Greenland national park. 112 The challenge is to integrate information collected by all assets into a comprehensive counterinsurgency intelligence picture. In this context, not only does shared information become the currency of trust but also such activities may involve the participation of indigenous people, emphasising their value to their respective Arctic polities and providing a medium for transmitting traditional skills and values.
The third threat is potentially the most severe -and perhaps the most overlooked. It is the risk that the community of nations will miss an opportunity to mitigate one of the worst risks of climate change -oceanic depletion. 113 The Arctic is of great significance as a political experiment. There are promising signs that political development in that region is rising to the challenge of climate change by emphasising local sovereignty and extant treaty law. As McGinn notes:
The Law of the Sea established a comprehensive framework governing ocean use and set such use in the context of environmental protection. Also for the first time, the Law of the Sea established a compulsory dispute resolution mechanism, referring unresolved issues to an international law tribunal. Rather than trying to address every individual concern and anticipate future issues, it recognized the need for parties to negotiate complementary and specific agreements.
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Such adaptability and political will is essential if the largest habitat on the planet -the global ocean -is to be managed responsibly. The Arctic may prove a much needed model of collaboration to be emulated in other parts of the planet, and in this context, political intelligence will be important in supporting negotiations and warning of potentially destabilising factors in treaty management.
Conclusions
This article has considered and redressed five myths regarding climate change and Arctic security. The simple answer to the question "Will conflict become more likely in the Arctic as the climate changes?" is yes, but not necessarily for the reasons generally discussed. The Arctic is a battlefield of ancient standing with brutal conditions. Climate change does not necessarily make Arctic resources easier to obtain, and when it does, there may be additional complications and consequences. There is now a proven link between climate change and an increase in conflict riskviolence at the interstate level is likely to spread to the Arctic. There is no sound evidence that Russia is trying to "take over the Arctic" and, in fact, has gone out of its way to work within treaty law. Finally, there are pirates in the Arctic -and they are a threat not only to the Arctic economy but also to its ecosystem.
The recent history and statistical lessons are clear -climate change will increase the probability of military and other forms of conflict in the Arctic. Intelligence will have a significant role in mitigating these risks by providing information regarding the potential for a military conflict that may spread to the Arctic. However, the more substantial tasks for the Intelligence Community may be in fostering trust through joint counterinsurgency operations and the support of the Arctic diplomacy that forms a model on which to confront the broader challenge of oceanic depletion. To ignore such an opportunity may in time prove the greatest risk of all.
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